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7An Early Modern Entrepreneur:  
Hendrik Oostwald Eksteen and the Creation of Wealth  
in Dutch Colonial Cape Town, 1702–1741
GERALD GROENEWALD1
Department of Historical Studies, University of Johannesburg2 
This article uses the career of Hendrik Oostwald Eksteen at the Cape between 
1702 and 1741 to illustrate the mechanisms free burghers could use to create 
wealth in an economically restrictive environment. By making use of the concept 
of entrepreneurship and its attendant issues, the article describes Eksteen sʼ rise 
to fortune and prestige through his exploitation of a combination of economic 
opportunities afforded by Cape Town sʼ position as a port servicing passing ships. 
Crucial to Eksteen sʼ later success was his successful use of the opportunities 
provided by the monopolistic alcohol retail market at the Cape. Eksteen sʼ initial 
success in this arena provided him with a capital base to pursue other opportuni-
ties in agriculture, fishing and meat provision, making him the wealthiest man at 
the Cape by the 1730s. The article also illustrates how Eksteen sʼ upward mobility 
was linked to his use of social capital and the cultivation of large social networks 
through kinship. It demonstrates, furthermore, that economic success was wound 
up with social power and prestige. In using the biography of Eksteen, the article 
argues for the importance of economic history in the study of the early modern 
Cape, but calls also for a study which links economic developments with social 
and cultural ones through a focus on individual entrepreneurs. Shown, too, is the 
fact that the existing conception of the rise of a Cape gentry in the eighteenth-
century needs to be revised to take into account the role of entrepreneurship, the 
urban foundations of wealth creation, as well as the role of the free black com-
munity in this process. 
Introduction: A German at the Cape
In June 1702 one Heinrich Oswald Eckstein, a 24-year-old soldier in the ser-
vice of the Vereenigde Oost-Indisch Geoctroijeerde Maatschappij (VOC) or 
Dutch East India Company, arrived with the ship Oostersteyn at the Cape of 
Good Hope.3 Here he became known as Hendrik Oostwald Eksteen. Born in 
1  Gerald Groenewald studied at the University of Cape Town and teaches at the University of Johannesburg. He has published 
(with Nigel Worden) Trials of Slavery, 1705-1794 (Cape Town, 2005), as well as several articles and essays on a wide 
variety of topics in seventeenth and eighteenth-century Cape history. 
2  I am most grateful to Andrew Bank, Susan Newton-King, Grietjie Verhoef and Nigel Worden for their advice and comments 
on earlier drafts of this article which greatly improved the ﬁnal product. They are of course not to be held responsible for 
what I have made of it. 
3  The Oostersteyn sailed into Table Bay on 12 June 1702 and left on 7 July; J. Bruijn, F. Gaastra and I. Schöffer, eds., Dutch 
Asiatic Shipping in the 17th and 18th Centuries (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979), vol. 2: 274-75 (no. 1883.4). 
8Lobenstein, Saxony, he grew up in a poor family who had been engaged for gen-
erations in the cottage industry or craft of cloth shearing (called tuchscherers in 
German).4 In a unique insight into his pre-Cape life, Eksteen is recorded in 1735 
as someone whose ʻprofession  ʼ had been wool farming ʻin the fatherlandʼ.5 In 
1695, when he was seventeen, an uncle and both his parents died leaving him 
with two younger siblings. Around his twentieth year he decided – for some 
unknown reason, though possibly connected to the death of his parents – to join 
the mighty Dutch East India Company.6 In this he was no exceptional young 
man: thousands of his compatriots during this period left their familiar surround-
ings, their family and network of friends and kin, the communities which shared 
their language, religion and culture in order to travel to the coastal cities of the 
Netherlands.7 Although the motivations for leaving their native German soil 
differed from individual to individual, the biggest single cause was economic.8 
The almost continual wars which the German lands experienced during the sev-
enteenth century resulted in economic and demographic upheavals with often 
deleterious effects on individuals. In personal and economic terms, particularly 
for young people, ʻ[r]ecurring warfare meant the loss of calculable perspectives 
for the futureʼ, and many chose to search for better prospects elsewhere.9 Nothing 
is known about the personal circumstances of Eksteenʼs departure from his native 
land.10 Even so, a decision such as his was one with major consequences: on the 
one hand, he was sacrificing the security provided by his kinship and social net-
works, though, on the other hand, by leaving his familiar surroundings and enter-
ing into new relationships elsewhere, he increased the number of opportunities 
available for exploitation. This step represented a major risk for the individual 
concerned, and for many German immigrants who entered VOC service it was a 
mistake leading, more often than not, to a premature death in impoverished cir-
cumstances on foreign soil. 
 Not so with Eksteen. His subsequent success at the Cape can only be 
described as spectacular. His disembarkation may have been accidental, as 
he is listed with the impotenten in the Company hospital on 1 July 1702.11 
Nevertheless, he decided to stay and became a free burgher in 1704. Within six 
years he was able to buy a prime farm. Eight years later, in 1718, he owned four 
4  J.P.G. Eksteen, ʻEnkele aantekeninge oor die familie Eksteenʼ, Familia 6, 2 (1969): 31-33.
5  G.C. de Wet, ed., Resolusies van die Politieke Raad, vol. 9, 1735-1739 (Pretoria: Government Printer, 1981): 10-11. 
6  Eksteen, ʻEnkele aantekeningeʼ: 33. At what point he left his two younger siblings to pursue his fortunes elsewhere is 
unknown. Given the chronology, it seems plausible that Eksteen may have undergone at least one return journey to the East 
Indies before the 1702 journey which deposited him at the Cape. 
7  For a recent synthesis of the literature on this topic, see E. Kuijpers, Migrantenstad: Immigratie en Sociale Verhoudingen in 
17e-eeuwse Amsterdam (Hilversum: Verloren, 2005): 37-81.
8  See R. van Gelder, Het Oost-Indisch Avontuur: Duitsers in Dienst van de VOC (1600-1800) (Nijmegen: SUN, 1997): 113-
122 for a discussion of the motivations of German emigrants for joining the VOC. 
9  B. Stier and W. von Hippel, ʻWar, Economy and Society  ʼin S. Ogilvie, ed., Germany: A New Social and Economic History, 
vol. II: 1630-1800 (London: Arnold, 1996): 256. 
10  Eksteenʼs leaving his ancestral town can plausibly be connected to his parents  ʼdeath, but was probably also motivated, 
directly or indirectly, by the upheavals caused by either the Wars of the Palatine (1688-97) or Spanish Succession (1701-
13). 
11  Cape Archives (CA), VC 40: 39.
9farms, three houses and a cellar in Cape Town, sizeable livestock holdings and 46 
slaves – his estate was valued at more than f 91 000.12 He was, without a doubt, 
one of the wealthiest men at the Cape, a remarkable achievement for someone 
who, fourteen years earlier, was listed in the opgaaf (the annual census for tax 
purposes) with no possessions. By 1731 Eksteen was the richest free burgher at 
the Cape of Good Hope: seven farms, six town properties, one hundred slaves, 
extensive livestock, including a large stable of fifty horses, and very big invest-
ments in wheat and vines.13 He was described at this time by Governor De la 
Fontaine, without qualification, as someone ʻdie rijkelijk kan bestaan  ʼ(who can 
exist wealthily).14 By the time of his death in 1741 his estate had increased even 
further,15 so much so that his widow had no need to remarry and brought up and 
established their ten minor children on her own. An indication of how enormous 
Eksteenʼs estate must have been is provided by the fact that when his widow died 
more than forty years later – and after providing their thirteen children with their 
rightful inheritance as they reached the age of majority – she did so as a very 
wealthy woman in her own right.16 
Towards an Economic Biography 
The great expansion of pre-industrial Cape historiography started in the early 
1980s as part of a revisionist project by English-language historians to write a 
more comprehensive history of South Africa, one which took class and capital 
seriously. Some of the first major studies of Cape slavery during the 1980s were 
strongly slanted towards economics.17 Additionally, Robert Rossʼs original inter-
est in issues like capital accumulation and class development18 led to the major 
12  This was before debt amounting to f 24 500 was subtracted, but even then it was a big estate; CA, MOOC 8/3 no. 93. The 
guilder (abbreviated to f) was a bookkeeping currency only: the actual money used for commerce at the Cape was the 
Rixdollar, one of which equated to f 3 (all currency ﬁgures in this article are converted to guilders). To set amounts like these 
in context: in this period, a healthy adult male slave cost about f 300-400. The governor, the highest paid ofﬁcial at the Cape, 
received f 2 400 per annum (plus various allowances), a VOC soldier f 108 (plus a food allowance). 
13  L. Guelke and R. Shell, ʻAn early colonial landed gentry: Land and wealth in the Cape Colony, 1682-1731ʼ, Journal of 
Historical Geography 9 (1983): 278.
14  This laconic expression obscures just how extraordinary this was by Cape standards: of the 938 people on De la Fontaineʼs 
list, only ten are described unqualiﬁedly as well-off or rich, i.e. without qualifying that they had debts. Only six of these 
were actually at the Cape (the others had repatriated), and of them it was Eksteen who was most active in economic terms. 
Three of these six were widows. Other than Eksteen, the men were Jan de With and Johannes Cruijwagen. The latter was 
Eksteenʼs brother-in-law. See L. Guelke, R. Shell and W. Whyte, eds., The De la Fontaine Report, 30th January 1732 (New 
Haven, 1990).
15  According to the 1741 opgaaf, ʻhe had doubled the size of his stable and increased his slave holdings by 25%ʼ, Guelke 
and Shell, ʻEarly colonial landed gentryʼ: 278. Unfortunately there exists no inventory of his estate after his death. Eksteen 
requested in his will of 1739 that his estate not be broken up and that it be handled en famille with no interference from the 
Orphan Chamber or other ofﬁcials. His wife was to be the sole executor; CA, CJ 2650: 253-59.
16  CA, CJ 2677: 396-438 (1784). She owned a residential house and three rented houses in town, four farms in Rondebosch 
and Tijgerberg (where she seems to have bred goats and horses) and 49 slaves. Her estate had in cash the equivalent of more 
than f 20 000 while it was owed a phenomenal amount of f 121 990 by creditors, indicating that she acted as a rentier. 
17  N. Worden, Slavery in Dutch South Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985) and M. Rayner, ʻWine and 
slaves: The failure of an export economy and the ending of slavery in the Cape Colony, 1806-1834  ʼ (unpublished PhD 
thesis, Duke University, 1986). Earlier work on the frontier was also very economically orientated, cf. S.D. Neumark, 
Economic Inﬂuences on the South African Frontier, 1652-1836 (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1957) and L.T. Guelke, 
ʻThe early European settlement of South Africa  ʼ(unpublished PhD thesis, University of Toronto, 1974). The latterʼs work 
and arguments had a great inﬂuence on scholars such as Robert Ross and Susan Newton-King. 
18  R. Ross, ʻThe rise of the Cape Gentryʼ, Journal of Southern African Studies 9 (1983): 193-217.
10
work he published in 1987 with Pieter van Duin on The Economy of the Cape 
Colony in the Eighteenth Century.19 This work inspired a series of important con-
tributions by Ross at the turn of the 1990s on the role of economics in the devel-
opment of Cape colonial society.20 Even the much more recent study by Susan 
Newton-King on the history of labour relations on the Cape Eastern Frontier has 
its roots in this tradition from the 1980s in its strong focus on how the Cape mar-
ket operated and influenced developments in the interior.21 This focus changed 
rather suddenly in the late 1990s when the cultural and narrative turns in histo-
riography worldwide engulfed Cape historiography almost at once. Instead of 
writing on institutions and groups, historians now focused on issues important to 
the individual, such as status, honour, sexuality and identity.22 A hallmark of this 
writing was the use of micro-history, based on court records, to reveal marginali-
ties and contingencies in the lived reality of individuals in the pre-industrial past 
of the Western Cape.23 This focus on the individual and the cultural has almost 
completely displaced work on the economy of the colonial period. 
 There is, however, an irony here. In the battle of ideas which characterised 
twentieth-century economic history, the Keynesian macroeconomic approach 
was dominant in the post-World War Two era. This started to change in the late 
1970s and 1980s when some world leaders took seriously the so-called Austrian 
Schoolʼs insistence on the supremacy of the freemarket, and with it the impor-
tance of individual freedom and choice.24 It was perhaps this renewed focus on 
the economic role of the individual which had led to an interest by economic 
historians in business history and entrepreneurship during the 1980s and 1990s.25 
Thus, since the 1990s, there has been an immense growth in the scholarship of 
19  Leiden: Intercontinenta. Although this work has been much utilised by early modern Cape historians, its obscure publication 
has meant that it is not as widely known among South African historians as it deserves to be. 
20  R. Ross, ʻThe origins of capitalist agriculture in the Cape Colony: A survey  ʼin W. Beinart, P. Delius and S. Trapido, eds., 
Putting a Plough to the Ground: Accumulation and Dispossession in Rural South Africa, 1850-1930 (Johannesburg: Ravan 
Press, 1986): 56-100; ʻThe Cape of Good Hope and the world economy, 1652-1835  ʼin R. Elphick and H. Giliomee, eds., 
The Shaping of South African Society, 1652-1840. 2nd ed., Cape Town: Maskew Miller Longman, 1989), 243-80 and ʻThe 
Cape economy and the Cape gentry  ʼin R. Ross, Beyond the Pale: Essays on the History of Colonial South Africa (Hanover 
and London: Wesleyan University Press, 1993): 13-49. 
21  S. Newton-King, Masters and Servants on the Cape Eastern Frontier (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
The late publication of this book belies its roots in the 1980s. For a succinct summary of the contribution of the literature 
discussed here to our understanding of the economic development of South Africa, see J. Iliffe, ʻThe South African 
Economy, 1652-1997ʼ, Economic History Review 52/1 (1999): 88-90. 
22  R. Ross, Status and Respectability in the Cape Colony, 1750-1870: A Tragedy of Manners (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999); N. Worden, ʻForging a Reputation: Artisan honour and the Cape Town Blacksmith Strike of 1752ʼ, 
Kronos 28 (2002): 43-65 and ʻ Strangers ashore: Sailor identity and social conﬂict in mid-18th-Century Cape Townʼ, Kronos 
33 (2007): 72-83; S. Newton-King, ʻFor the love of Adam: Two sodomy trials at the Cape of Good Hopeʼ, Kronos 28 
(2002): 21-42 and ʻSodomy, race and respectability in Stellenbosch and Drakenstein, 1689-1762: The story of a family, 
loosely deﬁnedʼ, Kronos 33 (2007): 6-44. Cf. N. Worden, ʻNew Approaches to VOC history in South Africaʼ, South African 
Historical Journal 59 (2007): 3-18 for a discussion of recent trends. 
23  The classic work in this genre is N. Penn, Rogues, Rebels and Runaways: Eighteenth-Century Cape Characters (Cape 
Town: David Philip, 1999). This work inspired other micro-histories, albeit with different aims and focuses, by historians 
such as Worden and Newton-King, as well as certain of their students. See the previous note for some examples. 
24  The watershed moment was probably the (controversial) award of the Nobel Prize in Economics to Friedrich von Hayek in 
1974. Together with his teacher, Ludwig von Mises, and Joseph Schumpeter, he is the best known of the Austrian School 
economists. It was the adoptation of Hayekʼs ideas by Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan which resulted in a rapid 
abondenment of the Keynesian approach in the 1980s. Cf. D. Yergin and J. Stanislaw, The Commanding Heights: The Battle 
for the World Economy (New York: Touchstone, 2002): esp. 123-33.
25  It is no coincidence that, with the exception of the venerable Business History (1959), most of the foremost academic 
journals in business history were founded in the 1980s and 1990s: Essays in Economic and Business History (1979); 
Accounting, Business and Financial History (1990) and Enterprise & Society (2000). 
11
the history of entrepreneurship in the early modern Netherlands.26 While Dutch 
historians have, understandably, focused on the role of entrepreneurs in the 
remarkable growth of their countryʼs economy in the seventeenth century, they 
have paid very little attention, as of yet, to the Dutch colonial world.27 Thus, dur-
ing the 1990s, when the time was ripe to build on the macroeconomic history of 
the Cape Colony established during the 1980s by focusing on the actors of the 
economy, as opposed to its structures, Cape historians completely moved away 
from economic history. While they did focus on individual lived experiences 
against the background of the social and cultural history of the pre-industrial 
Cape, they completely forgot about the importance of economics. 
 Thus, although a fair amount of work has been done on the Cape economy 
during the VOC period – of which Van Duin and Rossʼs monograph is the most 
significant – it has largely been concerned with depersonalised economic insti-
tutions and market forces. There has been little work on the actual actors in the 
economy.28 In a way, this study is a first attempt at starting to fill that gap. It aims 
to show that economic history needs to be taken seriously to understand properly 
the history of the colonial Cape. The approach is both wider in scope and concep-
tually more refined by using theoretical work on the operation of entrepreneur-
ship. This approach is not a return to the earlier work, but an attempt to flesh out 
the lived reality of inhabitants at the Cape by showing the links between eco-
nomic and social and cultural decisions made at an individual level. The concept 
of entrepreneur allows the historian to do this, since business decisions are not 
made in a theoretical vacuum, but within a social and cultural context. Applying 
this theoretical concept has not been done before for the pre-industrial Cape or, 
indeed, the Dutch colonial world. 
 A major achievement of the scholarship on the pre-industrial Cape from 
the 1980s was to reveal the development and workings of a landed gentry at the 
26  Cf. the following overview articles: F.M.M. de Goey, ʻOndernemergeschiedenis in Amerika, Nederland en België (1940-
1995). Trends in vraagstellingen, onderzoeksmethoden en themaʼs: Een overzichtʼ, NEHA-Jaarboek voor Economische, 
Bedrijfs- en Techniekgeschiedenis 59 (1996): 21-65; O. Gelderblom and J.L. van Zanden, ʻ Vroegmoderne Ondernemerschap 
in Nederlandʼ, NEHA Bulletin voor de Economische Geschiedenis 11/2 (1997): 3-15; O. Gelderblom, ʻUitdagingen voor 
de vroegmoderne ondernemersgeschiedenisʼ, NEHA Bulletin voor de Economische Geschiedenis 16/2 (2002), 69-81 and 
Anonymous, ʻNederlandse Ondernemersgeschiedenis (1995-2005): Een Aanvullingʼ, http://www.iisg.nl/ondernemers/
verderlezen.php (last accessed 25.03.2007). Major contributions during this period include the following collections of 
studies: C. Lesger and L. Noordegraaf, eds., Entrepreneurs and Entrepreneurship in Early Modern Times: Merchants and 
Industrialists within the Orbit of the Dutch Staple Market (The Hague: Hollandse Historische Reeks, 1995); C.A. Davids, W. 
Fritschy and L.A. van der Valk, eds., Kapitaal, Ondernemerschap en Beleid: Studies over Economie en Politiek in Nederland, 
Europa en Azië van 1500 tot Heden (Amsterdam: NEHA, 1996) and C. Lesger and L. Noordegraaf, eds., Ondernemers 
en Bestuurders: Economie en Politiek in de Noordelijke Nederlanden in de Late Middeleeuwen en Vroegmoderne Tijd 
(Amsterdam: NEHA, 1999). There is currently a large, government-funded project to compile a database of biographies of 
some 4 000 Dutch entrepreneurs: http://www.iisg.nl/ondernemers/ (last accessed 15.09.2009). 
27  An exception being F. de Goey and J.W. Veluwenkamp, eds., Entrepreneurs and Institutions in Europe and Asia, 1500-
2000 (Amsterdam: Aksant, 2002), although most of these essays do not deal with the early modern period. There is a large 
historiography on the history of trade in the VOC empire, but the focus is macro-economic and institutional (the VOC being 
the main character); cf. E.M. Jacobs, Merchant in Asia: The Trade of the Dutch East India Company during the Eighteenth 
Century (Leiden: CNWS, 2006) for the most recent synthesis. There has been important new work on entrepreneurship on 
regions of the Indian Ocean outside of the Dutch world; cf. e.g. R. Ptak and D. Rothermund, eds., Emporia, Commodities 
and Entrepreneurs in Asian Maritime Trade (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1991); R. Ptak and K.A. Sprengard, eds., Maritime Asia: 
Proﬁt Maximisation, Ethics and Trade Structure, 1300-1800 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1994); A. das Gupta, The World 
of the Indian Ocean Merchant, 1500-1800: Collected Essays (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001) and O. Prakash, 
Bullion for Goods: European and Indian Merchants in the Indian Ocean Trade, 1500-1800 (New Delhi: Manahor, 2004). 
28  Two notable exceptions exist: G. Wagenaar, ʻJohannes Gysbertus van Reenen: Sy Aandeel in die Kaapse Geskiedenis tot 
1806  ʼ(unpublished MA thesis, University of Pretoria, 1976) and G.A. Cockrell, ʻDie Lewe van Martin Melck, 1723-1781  ʼ
(unpublished MA thesis, University of Stellenbosch, 1984). 
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Cape during the eighteenth century. Thanks to the pioneering works of scholars 
like Robert Ross, Leonard Guelke and Robert Shell, this notion had become 
well entrenched.29 Despite differences in the approaches and conclusions of 
these scholars, it remains clear from their work that there existed a group of 
well-off families in the eighteenth-century colony whose fortunes were based 
on the accumulation of capital in the form of property (notably land) and labour 
(slaves). More recently, Susan Newton-King, Martin Hall and Wayne Dooling 
have contributed to this scholarship by demonstrating the importance to families 
of consolidating their wealth over generations, and noting the central role that 
women, particularly widows, played in the continuance of this group.30 Central 
to this interpretation is a focus on the agrarian districts and the belief that, over 
time, this group of people and their power were perpetuated through endogamous 
marriages between members of these leading burgher families. This article, based 
on extensive archival research into a wide variety of sources, challenges these 
assumptions. Firstly, it aims to show that the Cape gentry could, and did, have its 
roots as much in an urban as a rural context; while it also demonstrates, through 
the life story of Hendrik Oostwald Eksteen, that marriage between a free black 
and a European was no impediment to gentrification; indeed, as Eksteenʼs story 
shows, it could aid a person in social mobility. 
 With the exception of the better-known Martin Melk, Eksteenʼs career as a 
free burgher probably has no equivalent at the eighteenth-century Cape, and it is 
remarkable that it has hitherto received relatively little attention from historians.31 
The most extended discussion of his economic activities and achievements occurs 
in Guelke and Shellʼs article about the rise of an early colonial landed gentry at 
the Cape. Here Eksteen serves as an example of one of the ʻmany aggressive and 
upwardly mobile individualsʼ.32 In their argument, Eksteen serves to illustrate 
how the ʻCape gentry  ʼ– some of whom, like Eksteen, were parvenus – built up 
capital (in the form of land) and labour (in the form of slaves), which formed the 
basis of their wealth. These individuals are seen as essentially landed capitalists 
who consolidate and expand their wealth through agricultural activities. In their 
account of Eksteenʼs activities, Guelke and Shell make no attempt to explain how 
it was possible for this man who came to the Cape with no capital to be so suc-
29  Ross, ʻRise of the Cape Gentryʼ; Guelke and Shell, ʻEarly colonial landed gentryʼ. 
30  S. Newton-King, ʻIn search of notability: The antecedents of Dawid van der Merwe of the Koue Bokkeveldʼ, in S. Marks, 
ed., The Societies of Southern Africa in the 19th and 20th Centuries (London, 1994): 26–50; M. Hall, ʻThe secret lives of 
houses: Women and gables in the Eighteenth-Century Capeʼ, Social Dynamics 20 (1994): 1–48; and W. Dooling, ʻThe 
making of a colonial elite: Property, family and landed stability in the Cape Colony, c. 1750–1834ʼ, Journal of Southern 
African Studies 31 (2005): 147–62.
31  Although both are rags to riches stories, there is a signiﬁcant difference in their rise to wealth: Melkʼs early career at the 
Cape did reveal entrepreneurial activities, but he was suddenly catapulted to wealth and instant acceptance in the Cape 
gentry by marrying a wealthy widow; cf. Cockrell, ʻLewe van Martin Melk.  ʼEksteen, on the other hand, had a much slower 
and more staggered rise to wealth and social prestige. Unlike Melk, he had no lucky breaks. 
32  Guelke and Shell, ʻEarly colonial landed gentryʼ: 277. Their portrayal of Eksteen has been followed by others, e.g. Karel 
Schoeman, Armosyn van die Kaap: Die Wêreld van ʼn Slavin, 1652-1733 (Cape Town: Human & Rousseau, 2001): 688 
andʼn Duitser aan die Kaap, 1724-1765: Die Lewe en Loopbaan van Hendrik Schoeman (Pretoria: Protea, 2004): 215-16. 
There are short entries for Eksteen in J. Hoge, ʻ Personalia of the Germans at the Cape, 1652-1806  ʼin Archives Year Book for 
South African History 9 (1946): 86 and E. Moritz, Die Deutschen am Kap unter der Holländischen Herrschaft, 1652-1806 
(Weimar: Bohlaus, 1938): 228-29 though likewise not without their errors. Even the useful entry for Eksteen in J.A. Heese 
and R.T.J. Lombard, Suid-Afrikaanse Geslagregisters / South African Genealogies (15 vols, Pretoria and Stellenbosch: 
Genealogical Institute of South Africa, 1986-2007), vol. 2: 174-77 contains a number of mistakes.
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cessful economically. Nor do they account for the mechanisms which enabled 
his capital base of, say, 1718 to grow to what he owned by 1731. Although this 
is partly due to the fact that their overview of Eksteenʼs economic activities is 
incomplete and, in some cases, misleading,33 it is mainly the result of the fact that 
their approach to the establishment of wealth at the Cape is not applicable in the 
case of parvenus such as Eksteen. Analysing Eksteenʼs activities in terms of capi-
tal accumulation cannot account for his spectacular rise, especially in the early 
part of his career. 
 Eksteenʼs achievement can only be understood when his whole life course 
is considered in detail. This enables the historian to perceive the mechanisms 
that made it possible for Eksteen to achieve his successes. In addition, it allows 
the historian to discover how Eksteenʼs individual actions can be related to 
larger structural and systemic forces in place at the Cape. It is crucial, therefore, 
to study Eksteenʼs activities within the immediate context of the Cape of Good 
Hope and also within the contexts of the VOC world and the workings of the 
early modern economy. Moreover, it would be wrong to concentrate only on 
Eksteenʼs economic activities. As will become clear, his success in this field was 
bound up with both his personal and his public lives. 
 Capital, as Ludwig von Mises famously remarked pace Karl Marx, does not 
ʻbeget profitʼ.34 Entrepreneurial activities and decisions, however, do. Although 
Guelke and Shell once refer to Eksteen as an ʻentrepreneurʼ,35 they do not analyse 
his enterprises within a framework of entrepreneurship. Seeing Eksteen rather as 
a foremost exemplar of an early modern entrepreneur provides the historian with 
the theoretical framework to explain the mechanisms of Eksteenʼs success, and 
also to see the connections between Eksteenʼs economic activities, his personal 
and public life, and to relate all of these subjective factors to the larger context. 
The aim of this article, then, is to present a theoretical framework which would 
enable the Cape historian to analyse and understand the activities of men like 
Eksteen in a more complete and nuanced fashion. In doing so, I use Eksteenʼs life 
as a superstructure, not only because he is such an outstanding example of a Cape 
entrepreneur, but also because his life is so well documented. 
 The aforegoing paragraphs have suggested a way in which to view the 
activities of a person like Eksteen. It is my contention that the economic success 
of Eksteen at the Cape can be more plausibly described and understood with ref-
erence to entrepreneurship, rather than to capital accumulation. In order to expli-
cate this point, I present here the conceptual tools with which to do so, followed 
by an analysis of Eksteenʼs economic activities.
33  They are e.g. unaware of Eksteenʼs involvement in the alcohol pachten, thereby missing an important clue to his success. 
34  L. von Mises, ʻThe entrepreneur and proﬁt  ʼ(orig. publ. 1951), in Richard Swedburg, ed., Entrepreneurship: The Social 
Science View (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000): 97. Both Adam Smith and Karl Marx conﬂated capitalists with 
entrepreneurs. For a critique of this, see M. Blaug, ʻEntrepreneurship before and after Schumpeterʼ, in Economic History 
and the History of Economics (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1986): 219-22.
35  Guelke and Shell, ʻEarly colonial landed gentryʼ: 278.
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Early Modern Entrepreneurship: Risks, Profits and the Uses of Capital
At about the same time as Eksteen was successfully exploiting economic oppor-
tunities at the Cape, Richard Cantillon was reﬂecting in his Essai sur la nature de 
commerce en général (published posthumously in 1755) on the role of entrepre-
neurs in the economy. For Cantillon the entrepreneur was the link in the chain of 
distribution between producers and consumers. Since individuals do not have per-
fect foresight about the future, entrepreneurs have to exercise their business judge-
ment. This means that the willingness to take on risk and uncertainty becomes the 
distinguishing feature of an entrepreneur. Because the entrepreneur is willing to 
take on risks in order to make goods available at a given time and place, he func-
tions as the central actor in the economy who continually deals with uncertainty in 
his economic decisions.36 Entrepreneurial success therefore depends on success-
fully taking a chance or gambling on a true uncertainty.37
 P.W. Klein, the foremost scholar of early modern Dutch entrepreneurship, 
has identified the elementary features of entrepreneurial behaviour as, first, ʻthe 
management and administration of relatively scarce economic resources  ʼthrough 
ʻplanning on the basis of a mixture of rational calculation and inspired intuition 
in the face of competition under constantly changing market conditionsʼ. This 
implies the second feature, viz., taking the responsibility for risks, which in the 
case of early modern entrepreneurs meant ʻthe risks peculiar to creative optional 
choices between change and continuity, adaptation and originality, tradition and 
innovationʼ. Thus, the entrepreneur has to decide on ʻthe optimal position of the 
enterprise on a continuum between the two poles of security and uncertaintyʼ. For 
this reason Klein argues that the early modern entrepreneurʼs central task was ʻto 
balance risks and profitsʼ.38
 Uncertainty was all-pervasive in the world of early modern business. This 
was particularly the case with one of the most important aspects of entrepre-
neurship, viz., access to information. Due to the slow and unpredictable nature 
of the movement of news and knowledge, entrepreneurs were often unable to 
do proper risk analysis and could not adapt in time to changing circumstances. 
Hence Lesgerʼs characterisation of early modern entrepreneurship as ʻcalculated 
gamblingʼ. In addition, the slow and dangerous nature of transport as well as the 
smallness and instability of markets also added to the problems of early modern 
entrepreneurs.39 However, the fact that the early modern business world was one 
in which risks and uncertainties were plentiful must be seen in conjunction with 
36  R.L. Hébert and A.N. Link, The Entrepreneur: Mainstream Views and Radical Critiques 2nd ed.. (New York: Praeger 
1988): 19-28.
37  Blaug, ʻEntrepreneurshipʼ: 224-25; Link and Hébert, The Entrepreneur: 95-99.
38  P.W. Klein and J.W. Veluwenkamp, ʻThe Role of the entrepreneur in the economic expansion of the Dutch Republicʼ, in K. 
Davids and L. Noordegraaf, eds., The Dutch Economy in the Golden Age: Nine Studies (Amsterdam: NEHA, 1993): 28.
39  On uncertainty and risk, see C. Lesger, ʻOver het nut van huwelijk, opportunisme en bedrog: Ondernemers en 
ondernemerschap tijdens de Vroegmoderne tijd in theoretisch perspectiefʼ, in C.A. Davids, W. Fritschy and L.A. van der 
Valk, eds., Kapitaal, Ondernemerschap en Beleid: Studies over Economie en Politiek in Nederland, Europa en Azië van 
1500 tot Heden (Amsterdam: NEHA, 1996): 66-69 and L. Kooijmans, ʻRisk and reputation: On the mentality of merchants 
in the Early Modern Periodʼ, in C. Lesger and L. Noordegraaf, eds., Entrepreneurs and Entrepreneurship in Early Modern 
Times: Merchants and Industrialists within the Orbit of the Dutch Staple Market (The Hague: Hollandse Historische Reeks, 
1995): 28-29.
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the social and cultural nature of that world. The aim of entrepreneurs was defined 
above as financial and social gain. However, in the early modern world, at least 
in the Dutch case, another dimension has to be added to this. Dutch entrepre-
neurial enterprises were mostly family businesses founded on family capital. 
Entrepreneurs were motivated as much by their social environment as by a desire 
for profit. This includes a concern for the standing and future of the family. As 
a result of this, continuity became a very important factor influencing economic 
decisions. Since the social and economic position of the family had to be main-
tained and improved, it follows that an entrepreneur should not unnecessarily 
risk the economic, and hence social, downfall of the family. The aim of an entre-
preneur in such circumstances was to realise ʻthe largest trading results possible  ʼ
while ʻsafeguarding the continuity of the enterpriseʼ.40 In general, early modern 
entrepreneurship was characterised by the subordination of profit maximisation 
to long-term stability.41 How, then, did early modern entrepreneurs manage to 
diminish risks and minimise uncertainties? One way was to build up human capi-
tal, i.e. oneʼs skills and knowledge.42 An entrepreneur needed to have knowledge 
of the market and of the commodity he traded in, of the nature of that commod-
ity, of prices, demand, supply and possible markets. Hence, personal experience 
could play a major role, as well as the ability to learn from others, and to identify 
and exploit human capital in others.43 Another, more tangible form of protecting 
oneʼs position was to spread oneʼs investments. Dutch entrepreneurs often diver-
sified their estates by investing part of it in business, part in stocks and bonds and 
part in land and property. An entrepreneur had to weigh up the different advan-
tages of his investments since higher profits were to be made from high-risk ven-
tures while safe investments such as in land yielded low but stable interest.44
 Business, however, is not purely a matter of markets and investments. It is 
ﬁrst and foremost a social phenomenon where individual people interact with one 
another.45 Entrepreneurs are perhaps more than any other actors in the economy 
people-centred since they are mediators between producers and consumers. In the 
early modern high-risk context of doing business, trust was a crucial commodity. 
Trust can lead to loyalty from customers; open up new opportunities through rec-
ommendations; and provide credit. Hence, Veluwenkampʼs statement that ʻ[t]rust 
was perhaps even more important than capital, the main function of which indeed 
was … to generate trust, and thereby credit. Money is trust; the equation is revers-
ible.ʼ46 In practical terms this translated into a preference for doing business with 
family members, people from the same area, of the same background, etc. Another 
40  Klein and Veluwenkamp, ʻRole of the entrepreneurʼ: 36-38.
41  Kooijmans, ʻRisk and reputationʼ: 30 and Lesger, ʻOver het nutʼ: 71.
42  J. Field, Social Capital (London: Routledge, 2004): 50-51.
43  Klein and Veluwenkamp, ʻRole of the entrepreneurʼ: 41-42.
44  W. Frijhoff and M. Spies, 1650: Bevochten Eendracht (The Hague: Sdu, 1999): 19-20; P. Burke, Venice and Amsterdam: A 
Study of Seventeenth-century elites 2nd ed.. (Cambridge: Polity, 1994): 62-70.
45  Cf. M. Vaughan, ʻThe character of the market: Social identities in colonial economiesʼ, Oxford Development Studies 24 
(1996): 61-77.
46  Klein and Veluwenkamp, ʻRole of the entrepreneurʼ: 41.
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result was that reputation became a crucial resource. Reputation had to be earned 
– and it was something that only existed in a social context. Consequently, some-
one with a good reputation could be trusted and was deemed creditworthy. The 
converse, however, also held.47
 Trust and reputation are both related to perhaps the most important resource 
for early modern entrepreneurs: their social capital. Like capital, social capital 
can be accumulated and exploited, yet there is no direct relationship between 
inputs and outputs, and its value cannot be measured in terms of currency.48 Yet 
it remains a useful concept, defined by H.D. Flap as ʻan entity, consisting of all 
expected future benefits derived not from oneʼs own labor, but from connections 
with other personsʼ.49 Central to this definition are connections with other people, 
the results of which can be beneficial to an individual, while, similarly, being 
part of a network is central to building up social capital. Knowing a large num-
ber of people means greater access to credit and information, both of which are 
crucial for identifying and exploiting business opportunities. People need to both 
know and trust one another in order to cooperate. This, in turn, implies certain 
norms and expectations which relate to the important role of reputation – medi-
ated through third parties. Having a good social network is crucial for starting an 
economic enterprise, but it is also important for management and growth since 
networks give easy access to economic resources which would otherwise only 
be obtainable at great(er) cost.50 How does one acquire social capital? By help-
ing and giving to others who are thereby indebted to one. Such direct ties do not 
need to be the result of intentional acts but can get built up unconsciously over 
time. There are also indirect or weak ties with acquaintances and other people 
which are the ʻby-products of actions directed towards other goalsʼ.51 The extent 
of oneʼs social capital gets determined by three factors: (1) the size and scope of 
oneʼs social network; (2) the resources these friends and family have at their dis-
posal, and, equally crucial, (3) their willingness to make these resources available 
to one.52 
Eksteen the Entrepreneur: Alcohol 
Viewed against this background, everything in Eksteenʼs life – every experi-
ence, every acquaintance, every bit of knowledge he picked up – contributed in 
one way or another to his success. It is plausible that he kept up links with his 
home country or, more likely, that he used his ethnicity as a point of connection 
with other Germans in Cape Town. Certainly, his early years at the Cape indicate 
that this was the case. During his first two years at the Cape Eksteen seems to 
47  Lesger, ʻOver het nutʼ: 72 and Kooijmans, ʻRisk and reputationʼ: 30-32.
48  Field, Social Capital: 3, 9 and 12.
49  H.D. Flap, ʻPatronage: An institution in its own rightʼ, in M. Hechter, K.D. Opp and R. Wippler, eds., Social Institutions: 
Their Emergence, Maintenance and Effects (New York: De Gruyter, 1990): 232.
50  Field, Social Capital: 50-57 and 62-65. It should be noted that there is some debate as to whether trust ought to be considered 
integral to social capital or rather as one of its outcomes. 
51  Flap, ʻPatronageʼ: 232-33. 
52  Flap, ʻPatronageʼ: 231-32 and Lesger, ʻOver het nutʼ: 66. 
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have had close contact with the free-black community: he procreated at least two 
illegitimate children, both born around 1704, the year in which he became a free 
burgher, with free black women.53 The first, also called Hendrik, was conceived 
with Anna Maria Colijn, who thereafter disappeared from his life.54 This son later 
achieved some notoriety on the Cape frontier when he was murdered by his Khoi 
mistress.55 The second son, called Michiel, was conceived with Sara, the illegiti-
mate daughter of a fellow German, Paul Heijns, and the freed slave Maria Schalk. 
Heijns was at this stage married to another free-black woman, Maria Lozee.56 By 
then Heijns had been at the Cape for a few decades and made his living from 
various farming enterprises, although he was not very successful and was in debt 
to the Orphan Chamber and the Poor Fund.57 Shortly after the birth of Michiel, 
Eksteen married Sara Heijns on 13 July 1704. 
 It is plausible that Eksteen at first worked with his father-in-law, thereby 
gaining experience and knowledge of the Cape circumstances, and also building 
up social capital with the links Heijns had.58 A revealing indication of Eksteenʼs 
social network at this early stage comes from the fact that he was one of the sig-
natories in early 1706 of a testimonial to the ʻhonour and virtue  ʼof W.A. van der 
Stel. Eksteenʼs support of this testimonial was most likely influenced by the fact 
that his father-in-law was a supporter of the Van der Stel faction, and along with 
most of the free blacks of Cape Town signed this testimonial, including the rela-
tions of Eksteenʼs late mother-in-law, Maria Schalk.59 That Eksteenʼs early sup-
port and contacts were with the free-black community he entered via his wife and 
father-in-law is also revealed by his friendship with Claas Cornelisz (another sig-
natory of the Van der Stel testimonial) and Beatrice van Couchin.60 When the lat-
ter couple drew up their will in 1709, they made provision for Michiel, Eksteenʼs 
son with Sara Heijns. This friendship seemingly survived Eksteenʼs later success, 
for in 1720 he acted as an executor of Beatriceʼs estate.61 
 How was a newly released free burgher to maintain himself and his young 
family? Since the Cape was controlled by the VOC, which did not permit a free 
market and jealously guarded its monopoly, options were limited. Free burghers 
53  The exact chronology is uncertain: Hendrik Eksteen was baptised in February 1705, so was plausibly born either early that 
year or more likely in 1704. The date of birth of Michiel is equally uncertain: he was later referred to as a voorkind which 
means he must have been born before the marriage of Eksteen with Sara Heijns in July 1704 (in the event he was baptised 
in April 1705). Having illegitimate children was no impediment to social or other success in the eighteenth-century Cape; 
cf. G. Groenewald, ʻ“A mother makes no bastard”: Family law, sexual relations and illegitimacy in Dutch Colonial Cape 
Town, c. 1652-1795ʼ, African Historical Review 39/2 (2007): 58-90.
54  H.F. Heese, Groep sonder Grense: Die Rol en Status van die Gemengde Bevolking aan die Kaap, 1652-1795 (Bellville: 
Wes-Kaaplandse Instituut vir Historiese Navorsing, 1984): 48. 
55  Cf. R. Viljoen, ʻ“Till murder do us part”: The story of Griet and Hendrik Eksteenʼ, South African Historical Journal 33 
(1995): 13-32.
56  Heese and Lombard, Genealogies, vol. 2: 174 and Hoge, ʻPersonaliaʼ: 161. 
57  G.C. de Wet, Die Vryliede en Vryswartes in die Kaapse Nedersetting, 1657-1707 (Cape Town: Historiese Publikasie-
Vereniging, 1981): 108 and H.C.V. Leibbrandt (ed. & tr.), Precis of the Archives of the Cape of Good Hope: The Defence of 
Willem Adriaan van der Stel (Cape Town: Richards, 1897): 184-85.
58  For a more extensive discussion of the role that kinship and ʻ ethnic identity  ʼplayed in the entrepreneurial success of German 
immigrants at the Cape during this period, see G. Groenewald, ʻEen dienstig inwoonder: Entrepreneurs, social capital and 
identity in VOC Cape Town, c. 1720-1750ʼ, South African Historical Journal 59 (2007): 138-44.
59  Leibbrandt, Precis: Defence; 69-72. My thanks to Karel Schoeman who alerted me to this. 
60  M. Upham, ʻArmosyn revisitedʼ, Capensis 2 (2000): 26.
61  A.J. Böeseken, ed., Resolusies van die Politieke Raad, vol. 6, 1720-1723 (Cape Town: Government Printer, 1965): 78-79.
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remained subjects of the VOC and their activities had to aid the VOC in its 
aims. At the Cape this primarily meant being engaged in the productive sector, 
particularly agriculture, and only secondarily in the service sector. Although the 
Cape did not have a completely free market system since the Company bought 
most agricultural produce at pre-determined prices, there still existed a small 
retail market.62 It was cheaper for the VOC to lease certain productive activities 
to free burghers. The best example of this system was the meat pacht (monopoly 
or lease) whereby three to five individuals were contracted to provide passing 
ships and the VOC establishment at the Cape with meat at a fixed price, usu-
ally for periods of multiple years.63 There were also certain needs of both free 
burghers and callers at the Cape which had to be met. One of these was the 
demand for alcohol and sociability in taverns. This trade was immensely lucra-
tive with the result that the VOC was unwilling to allow complete free trade in 
alcohol, but tried to control it through selling monopolies or pachten to the free 
burghers.64 Despite the restrictions, the alcohol trade was perhaps the closest the 
VOC Cape came to a free market system since any person could invest in one of 
the pachten as the sole criterion for ownership was a financial one.65 Thus, seen 
from the viewpoint of entrepreneurial activities, there were fewer opportunities 
for exploitation at the Cape, although the very restrictions of the system created 
some other, albeit illegal, ones. It is by forgetting about the opportunities that the 
alcohol pacht system provided that Guelke and Shell missed the key to Eksteenʼs 
spectacular rise to success. 
 In August 1707 Eksteen bought one of the brandy pachten for f 2 725.66 The 
fact that he bought the fourth quarter of the brandy pacht and paid a higher price 
than the others fetched may indicate that he was quite keen to get a pacht.67 It is 
unknown how much capital Eksteen had by this stage, but it need not have been 
much: the price he offered for the pacht had to be paid in two instalments, the 
first only after six months. A year later he borrowed f 3 000 from a fellow brandy 
pachter, Claas Meijboom, and it is plausible that they may have been business 
partners and that Meijboom could have helped him earlier as well.68 Eksteenʼs 
62  O. Mentzel, A Geographical-Topographical Description of the Cape of Good Hope (Cape Town: Van Riebeeck Society, 
1944), vol. 2: 75-92 provides an eye-witness account of the retail market at the Cape during this period, and the various 
possibilities (and abuses) afforded by the calling of the VOC ﬂeets twice a year which not only meant an inﬂux of customers 
and money, but also of retail goods. 
63  See on the meat pacht, H.B. Thom, Die Geskiedenis van die Skaapboerdery in Suid-Afrika (Amsterdam: Swets & Zeitlinger, 
1936): 133-43; G.J. Erasmus, ʻDie Geskiedenis van die Bedryfslewe aan die Kaap, 1652 tot 1795  ʼ(PhD thesis, University 
of the Orange Free State, 1986): 205-8 and Wagenaar, ʻJohannes Gysbertus van Reenenʼ: 36-129.
64  On the operation of the system and its contribution to the VOCʼs revenue, see Groenewald, ʻEen dienstig inwoonderʼ: 127-
30.
65  There were also other retail sectors which provided in the needs of the free burgher population, though much of this was 
informal (and sometimes illegal). Regular calls from free burghers to allow free trade fell on deaf ears and was to become 
one of the biggest grievances of the Cape free burgher population; cf. A.J. Böeseken, ʻDie Nederlandse Kommissarisse en 
die 18de-eeuse samelewing aan die Kaapʼ, Archives Year Book for South African History 7 (1944): 174-88.
66  It is signiﬁcant that he ﬁrst invested in brandy. It was, along with the Cape wine, the most popular of the alcohol pachten 
and had a huge set-off (reﬂected by the fact that both pachten were divided into four parts). Unlike Cape wine, though, the 
brandy pachten could be bought much cheaper. 
67  The brandy pachten were sold in four parts, each auctioned off separately. The VOC bookkeepers noted in which order 
the parts were sold. Since auctions ﬁrst went up to a high price, and then down from a much higher price, it is likely that a 
nervous, inexperienced or very keen buyer would stop the bidding at a higher price than what it could have gone for. 
68  Deeds Ofﬁce, Cape Town (DO), T 17, 04.09.1708. Eksteen was able to fully repay his debt within a year along with the 6% 
interest charged. My thanks to Susan Newton-King for sharing the Deeds Ofﬁce references with me. 
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main capital outlay would have been his stock of liquor and perhaps some fur-
niture and other equipment to turn a room of his house into a tavern.69 Thus, 
during 1708–9 he bought at various auctions equipment such as lamps, drinking 
and eating vessels, as well as game boards which were popular entertainment 
in taverns.70 What is most significant about this venture is that Eksteen entered 
the alcohol retail trade at the same time as his father-in-law, Paul Heijns, who 
bought one of the Cape wine pachten for f 8 325. They may well have decided to 
share the costs and run one tavern together selling both brandy and wine (a com-
mon practice). This cannot be proved, but given Eksteenʼs later history and the 
fact that Heijns had not invested in the alcohol pachten in the decade or more in 
which he had been a free burgher, it seems plausible that it was Eksteenʼs idea to 
invest in the alcohol pachten. 
 Investing in the alcohol retail trade at the Cape was, at best, a risky business. 
The fact that, in addition to oneʼs outlay costs, one had to pay a sizeable premium 
to the VOC for the privilege, plus the fact that retail prices were fixed, meant that 
the variable of demand carried even greater importance. Since the pachten were 
auctioned off at the beginning of the pacht year (September), before demand was 
known, it meant that at best prospective pachters made a calculated guess as to 
how much they could offer for the privilege of retailing alcohol (usually based on 
the experience of the preceding few years). Since the stable, local Cape market 
was relatively small, the profitability (assuming that there were no problems with 
supply) of alcohol retail in Cape Town depended crucially on the number of ships 
calling and the amount of time their crews had to spend in town visiting taverns. 
At the time that Eksteen entered the alcohol retail business, the number of ships 
that called at the Cape – both Dutch and foreign – remained stable and grew 
slightly in absolute terms.71
  Eksteen was clearly successful enough to pay the VOC its due for his ﬁrst 
pacht, and his experience was sufﬁciently positive to make him continue invest-
ing in the brandy pachten, with Heijns continuing with the wine pachten, for the 
following three years. Curiously enough, Eksteen did not use his early success to 
expand his alcohol pacht interest, as most other successful pachters tended to do, 
i.e. by buying more and more pachten, but he preferred to slowly diversify his 
investments. He must have bought livestock during his ﬁrst years as a pachter, 
for at the beginning of 1709 he was granted a grazing licence at Dieprivier.72 Dur-
ing that same year he utilised his free-black links by buying two houses in Cape 
Town.73 The following year he bought his ﬁrst farm, in the Tijgerberg, naming 
69  Though he could have bought the liquor on credit; as he did in 1710 when he entered into a contract with Henning Hüsing 
for almost f 3 000 for liquor provided on credit; this debt Eksteen was able to repay within less than a year; DO, T 19: 
292. 
70  Cf. e.g. CA, MOOC 10/1 nos 47 and 56.
71  This is based on an analysis of the relevant ﬁgures in Bruijn, Gaastra and Schöffer, eds., Dutch Asiatic Shipping, vols. 2-3.
72  CA, RLR 1: 80.
73  DO, T 18: 31.05.1709 and 14: 11.1709. In May 1709 Eksteen paid f 940 cash to the ex-Company slave, Sara Jansz (aka Sara 
van de Caab) for her house in block K, and in November Eksteen bought a larger house from Jan Oberholster for f 3 400, 
f 1 500 of which he paid cash. The latter was no free black, but his relationship with Agnieta Colijn, the sister of the mother 
of Eksteenʼs ﬁrst-born son, caused some notoriety during this period; cf. Schoeman, Armosyn, 653. The latter transaction is 
a good example of the workings of social capital, as Eksteen in exchange stood as one of Oberholsterʼs sureties when the 
latter bought a farm a year later; cf. DO, T 19: 283, 285.
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it after his home town (ʻdutchiﬁed  ʼ to Loewenstein), for the large sum of 
f 12 000.74 By the early 1710s Eksteen both exploited the one lucrative retail mar-
ket at the Cape, viz. the alcohol trade, and started to invest in the main economic 
activity of Cape free burghers, viz. agriculture. The alcohol pachten allowed one 
to make a quick proﬁt with relatively low input costs, but had high risks built into 
the system. Agriculture required a larger capital base, yielding slower and less 
spectacular proﬁt, but had the advantage of greater stability while offering the pos-
sibility to expand greatly. 
 By 1710 Eksteen had clearly built up sufficient experience and confidence 
in his entrepreneurial activities to attempt expansion in the hope of greater prof-
its. He formed an illegal cartel with his father-in-law and two other pachters in an 
attempt to control the most lucrative of pachten, viz. that of Cape wine. By doing 
this they, presumably, had hoped to control the first great uncertainty of investing 
in alcohol pachten: the price paid for the monopoly. In the event, the conspiracy 
was discovered and the pacht was re-auctioned after a month.75 This was no set-
back for Eksteen: in 1711 he successfully bid for one of the Cape wine pachten, 
along with his usual brandy pacht. This expansion into wine retail shows how 
confident Eksteen was that he could pull it off: a wine pacht by this stage usu-
ally sold for about three times as much as a brandy pacht.76 Yet despite the 
higher risks Eksteen managed to make a success of the wine retail trade as well. 
Throughout the 1710s he managed to buy one brandy and one wine pacht every 
year until 1720 when he bought two wine pachten. After that year he ceased to 
invest in the alcohol pachten. During the fourteen consecutive years that Eksteen 
invested in the alcohol pachten, he bought the rights to 14 brandy and 11 Cape 
wine pachten, for which he paid the Company in total f 113 270. 77 Unfortunately, 
owing to the lack of the necessary data, it is not possible to calculate the profit 
Eksteen made from his investments. In general pachters could sell brandy at 
twice the price they paid for it, which should translate into a sizeable profit.78 
Of course, this is without taking into account the manifold running and capital 
expenses a pachter incurred, but since many of these could be offset against capi-
tal investments (in labour, property and movable goods), it meant that the longer 
one was engaged in the alcohol retail business, the higher oneʼs yields had to be. 
What is remarkable about Eksteenʼs involvement in the alcohol pachten is his 
stable and controlled conduct. Unlike other pachters he did not overplay his hand 
by using his profits to invest in ever larger-shares of the alcohol retail market.79 
74  DO, T 19: 352. He paid f 4 000 in cash and undertook to repay the remaining sum in two instalments over two years. 
75  CA, C 2702: 14-17 and 22-6; A.J. Böeseken, ed., Resolusies, vol. 4, 1707-1715: 172-83.
76  The fact that he owned several properties by this stage could also have aided him in securing loans. 
77  Data on Eksteenʼs investment in the alcohol pachten are derived from the original contracts, CA, C 2697-2702 and, for the 
years where they are missing (1715-1727), CA, C 2730.
78  In the 1718 inventory of Eksteenʼs estate, a legger brandy (560 litres) was valued at f 175 (CA, MOOC 8/3 no. 93). 
According to the 1725 price regulations of the VOC, brandy pachters could sell their product at four schellingen per bottle 
(2.4 litres) which means that a legger brandy would retail at f 350. Cf. G.J. Krause, ʻDrankpagte gedurende die eerste 
honderd jaar van die bewind van die N.O.I.K. aan die Kaap  ʼ(MA thesis, University of the Orange Free State, 1955): 110 
for the prices of brandy. 
79  This meant that as time went by (assuming all variants remained stable) his proﬁts should have increase as most of his 
capital lay-out (e.g. investing in a room or building for his tavern; a store; vats; furniture and drinking vessels and, probably, 
a slave or slaves to work in his tavern) would have been incurred early on in his career as taverner. 
21
Instead, he kept his investment more or less stable during the 1710s and used the 
profits to build up a capital base with which to undertake new entrepreneurial 
endeavours. His behaviour reveals someone who was remarkably well aware of 
the possibilities available for exploitation at the Cape. 
 Eksteenʼs early years at the Cape are the most obscure to the historian, but 
it seems clear that his connections with, and marriage into, the free-black com-
munity, as well as his links with the fellow German Paul Heijns, must have been 
a factor in his early ventures into the alcohol retail trade. It is no coincidence 
that he and his father-in-law both started to invest in alcohol pachten at the same 
time, and that Eksteen – as soon as he could afford it – entered agricultural life at 
the Cape. By adding his support to that of the free-black and urban community 
for the powers-that-be in 1706, Eksteen ensured their goodwill (and that of his 
father-in-law) – an example of investing in social capital – which was necessary 
for someone who soon thereafter entered the retail world of Cape Town. During 
the 1720s, Eksteenʼs shaky beginnings as a businessman at the Cape would 
expand spectacularly, leading to greater social prestige. 
Eksteen the Entrepreneur: Farming and Fishing 
After buying his first farm in 1710 for f 12 000, Eksteen spent most of his profit 
(except for what he needed to continue in the alcohol retail business) on his 
agricultural concerns. He continually obtained grazing licences and loan farms 
in prime areas around Cape Town, implying increasing herds of stock.80 During 
these years he often bought livestock at auctions.81 In addition to his six loan 
farms, he bought three more freehold farms between 1710 and 1718, and by the 
latter date he also owned three houses in Cape Town as well as a store or cellar 
in which to keep his taverns  ʼsupplies.82 By 1718 his stock holdings had grown to 
1600 sheep, 350 heads of cattle and a surprising 30 horses, which suggests that 
he must have bred horses, a very profitable undertaking owing to the scarcity of 
horses at the Cape.83 It seems from his holdings and the variety of land he owned 
and loaned that he was equally engaged in stock and crop farming.84 He also 
seems to have produced on his farms at least some of the wine and brandy he sold 
in his taverns in town since he owned two distilling kettles and a wine press.85 
 Eksteen, though, was never satisfied with going the safe route of investing 
in land and expanding his agricultural activities. He kept his eyes open for new 
opportunities. Already in 1713 he and Willem ten Damme offered to buy the 
meat pacht. Their application was unsuccessful as the Council of Policy preferred 
to continue with the incumbent meat pachters.86 This step of Eksteen is somewhat 
80  CA, RLR 1: 261, 318, 336 and 2: 62, 90, 128. 
81  E.g. CA, MOOC 10/1 nos. 68, 75 and 76.
82  CA, MOOC 8/3 no. 93.
83  Cf. S. Swart, ʻRiding high: Horses, power and settler society, c. 1654 -1840ʼ, Kronos 29 (2003).
84  E.g. already by 1712 he both kept cattle and planted wheat on the post Burgerspost in the Groenekloof; Böeseken, ed., 
Resolusies vol. 4: 274, 277 and 314.
85  CA, MOOC 8/3 no. 93.
86  Böeseken, ed., Resolusies vol. 4: 323.
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surprising as he did not own sufficient land and cattle to take on the major risk of 
supplying the Company with meat for several years.87 It seems more likely that it 
was Ten Damme who was the main investor and senior partner in this case and 
that he chose Eksteen for his financial acumen to be the managing partner. This 
incident indicates that Eksteenʼs links with the pro-W.A. van der Stel factions 
survived into the 1710s: Ten Damme was a supporter of and former high-rank-
ing official under Van der Stel, who greatly benefited from the the Governorʼs 
favour.88 It also illustrates the power of networks; in this case a negative one. 
The Council of Policy stated that its awareness of the applicants  ʼ ʻpartisanship  ʼ
against the current meat pachters played a role in its rejection of the bid. One of 
the incumbent pachters was the wealthy Jacobus van der Heijden – who played a 
prominent role in the anti-Van der Stel faction and was the long-standing business 
partner of Henning Hüsing. Hüsing was responsible for the financial troubles of 
Paul Heijns – or so it was believed.89 At any rate, Ten Damme died the following 
year and Eksteen waited more than a decade before again investing in the meat 
pacht. 
 Eksteenʼs opportunism did, however, pay off handsomely in another case. 
In 1717 he bought a boat for f 2 000 – a sizeable capital outlay. This was the 
first step in a careful strategy. Eksteen petitioned the Council of Policy that he 
did not want the boat to go to waste and thus requested permission to fish in the 
well-stocked waters of Saldanha Bay, an area which at this stage the Company 
had decided to keep for its own use (in order to provide fish for the Slave Lodge, 
the garrison and passing ships). In exchange for this prerogative Eksteen was 
prepared to supply the Company gratis with a mutually agreed quantity of salted 
fish. This reflects how well aware Eksteen was of the market conditions and eco-
nomic opportunities at the Cape. There was at this stage an increasing demand 
for fish from free burghers for their growing number of slaves,90 a demand which 
could not be fully met by the so-called ʻfree fishers  ʼwho were restricted to Table 
Bay. Thus by having a monopoly of Saldanha Bay his profits could soar. Eksteen 
must also have been aware of the enormous success his one-time fellow pachter 
Johannes Phijffer and Simon van der Stel had had between 1711 and 1716 when 
they were contracted to be the sole providers of the Companyʼs fish demands.91 
Perhaps he was hoping that this might be the outcome of his request. In the event 
Eksteenʼs plans were thwarted since the Council of Policy decided that grant-
87  A meat pachter did not primarily provide the cattle from his own farms and holdings, but usually bought them from other 
farmers. However, it helped having a good base in oneʼs own holdings (most meat pachters also owned extensive land and 
cattle) and a meat pachter needed grazing land for the cattle while waiting for the VOC ﬂeets – the major consumers of 
meat. 
88  It was rumoured at the time that Ten Dammeʼs wife was Van der Stelʼs mistress. In 1708, after Van der Stelʼs downfall, Ten 
Damme became a free burgher and built up much land and stock holdings (as did his sons and wife, Helena Gulix, who 
by 1731 was one of the six richest inhabitants of the Cape); cf. his entry by A.J. Böeseken in C. J. Beyers, ed., Dictionary 
of South African Biography, vol. 4 (Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 1981): 644-45 and Schoeman, Armosyn: 
226. 
89  Cf. Leibbrandt, Precis: Defence: 184-85. Eksteen too had had business dealings with Hüsing. 
90  Between 1711 and 1733 the number of burgher slaves increased from 1771 to 4 709; cf. N. Worden, Slavery in Dutch South 
Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985): 11.
91  C.F.J. Muller, ʻDie geskiedenis van vissery aan die Kaap tot aan die middel van die Agtiende Eeuʼ, Archives Year Book for 
South African History 5, 1 (1942): 22-28 and A.J. Böeseken, Simon van der Stel en sy Kinders (Cape Town: Nasou, 1964): 
217-18.
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ing him a monopoly in Saldanha Bay would look like favouritism.92 Ultimately, 
however, Eksteen was successful since the Council resolved to open fishing in 
Saldanha Bay to all free burghers on condition that they cede 20 per cent of their 
catch to the VOC for use in the Slave Lodge.93 
 Eksteen soon made a success of this venture. The competition could not 
have been great since few burghers would have had the capital outlay to invest 
in the large vessel required for journeys to Saldanha Bay, and the prospects were 
sufficiently good for Eksteen to decide on further capital investment for exploit-
ing this opportunity fully, such as erecting a small house there for his fishermen.94 
The fishing industry was visibly successful and a major source of Eksteenʼs 
growing wealth by the late 1710s, so much so that it is plausible that this may 
have played a role in his decision to stop investing in the alcohol pachten. A 
marker of Eksteenʼs increasing concentration in this industry was that he bought 
another small ship sometime between 1718 and 1720.95 Eksteenʼs original wish 
was fulfilled, for by 1721 he was the main supplier of fish to the VOC authorities 
at the Cape – a very large and stable market.96 The VOC was sufficiently depen-
dent upon Eksteenʼs supply of fish by 1729 to have offered him very favourable 
terms on which to continue his service.97 By this stage the VOC was his sole 
market. In 1733 their relationship was formalised when Eksteen was contracted 
to provide the Company at the Cape with all its fishing needs for five years. This 
Eksteen achieved by threatening the VOC with ending his supply since, so he 
claimed, it was not profitable enough for him. To ensure a continuous supply 
for the authorities not only gave him this relatively safe (in terms of risk) con-
tract, but even sold him one of their vessels.98 This contract was renewed after its 
expiry and continued by his widow after Eksteenʼs death.99 In this fashion, then, 
Eksteen managed to exploit another of the few viable economic opportunities at 
the Cape, and indeed seems to have dominated the fishing industry for more than 
two decades. 
 The 1710s was not only a decade during which Eksteen greatly expanded 
his economic interests; it was also a period in which his social network expanded 
outside the urban free-black community. After buying his first farm in 1710, 
Eksteen soon started building up good networks with the farming community 
of the Cape district. Through his business activities and his family, social and 
political life, Eksteen built up connections. At the Cape, marriage strategy was 
an important factor in social mobility.100 It is plausible that Eksteen developed 
ties with the Cruijwagen family early on in his career since Jan Mijndertsz 
92  G.C. de Wet, ed., Resolusies van die Politieke Raad, vol. 5, 1716-1719 (Cape Town: Government Printer, 1964): 175.
93  Muller, ʻGeskiedenis van die visseryʼ: 28.
94  Böeseken, ed., Resolusies vol. 4: 395.
95  It must have been bought after the 1718 inventory and before January 1721 when the VOC considered approaching Eksteen 
to buy this vessel; A.J. Böeseken, ed., Resolusies vol. 6: 93.
96  This seems to have the practice but there is no formal contract due to the loss of such records for the period 1715-1727; 
Muller, ʻGeskiedenis van die visseryʼ: 28.
97  G.C. de Wet, ed., Resolusies van die Politieke Raad, vol. 8, 1729-1734 (Pretoria: Government Printer, 1975): 60.
98  CA, C 2705: 17-18; De Wet, ed., Resolusies, vol. 8: 310-11, 313.
99  CA, C 2705: 18-19 and C 122, 440-42 (per TANAP); G.C. de Wet, ed., Resolusies van die Politieke Raad, vol. 10, 1740-
1743 (Pretoria: Government Printer, 1984): 65.
100  Cf. Groenewald, ʻEen dienstig inwoonderʼ: 139-41.
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Cruijwagen was another of the signatories in favour of W.A. van der Stel. 
Cruijwagen had invested in the alcohol pachten during the younger Van der Stelʼs 
governorship, and did so again in the year that Eksteen and his father entered the 
alcohol retail business.101 Eksteen must have cultivated these links, for in 1714, 
after the death of his first wife, he married the young Everdina Cruijwagen, the 
daughter of Jan Mijndertsz. This was a much more advantageous match than with 
the late Sara Heijns, but Eksteenʼs circumstances had changed radically during 
his first ten years at the Cape. Paul Heijns, who acted as a partner of Eksteen 
in their alcohol retail business, possibly died in the 1713 smallpox epidemic. 
Cruijwagen – whose investments in the alcohol pachten were very haphazard (i.e. 
in different pachten over a long period) – started investing in them again in 1716, 
which makes it likely that this was done in partnership with, or at least with the 
close cooperation of, Eksteen. Cruijwagen was a well-off man who owned four 
houses in Cape Town and could loan sizeable amounts of money to a range of 
individuals.102 It is not implausible that he helped Eksteen with capitalising some 
of his ventures in the late 1710s and 1720s. By the time of Cruijwagenʼs death 
in 1728, his granddaughter, Catharina Rosina Eksteen, inherited one-third of his 
large estate since her mother had died in 1718. Seen purely in economic terms, 
Eksteenʼs connections with the Cruijwagen family paid off handsomely. 
 By the second half of the 1710s, when Eksteen was newly married to 
Everdina Cruijwagen and busily expanding his business interests, his social posi-
tion and prestige also improved. It has long been recognised that entrepreneurial 
activity is about more than pure economics as the motivation of an entrepreneur 
consists of both economic and extra-economic gain.103 An entrepreneur can 
therefore be defined as someone who is ʻingenious and creative in finding ways 
that add to their own wealth, power and prestigeʼ.104 In line with this, the eco-
nomic historian Clé Lesger has argued that entrepreneurship is ultimately only 
a means to an end, viz. the realisation of oneʼs wishes and desires. These wishes 
and desires can be grouped into three categories: wealth, power and prestige.105 
Whether or not Eksteen felt the need to prove himself is something the historian 
cannot know for certain.106 Clearly, by the late 1710s Eksteen had amassed suf-
ficient riches to be one of the foremost burghers in economic terms. From this 
period onwards, his economic successes also translated into power and prestige 
in the Cape context. 
101  On Jan Mijndertsz Cruijwagenʼs career at the Cape, see W.A. Cruywagen, Die Cruywagens van Suid-Afrika, 1690-1806 
(Vanderbijlpark: Kleio, 2007): 135-96.
102  CA, MOOC 8/5 no 19. Guelke and Shell, ʻEarly colonial landed gentryʼ: 277 exaggerate when they claim that Cruijwagen 
was the ʻmain creditor  ʼat the Cape – although many creditors owed him money at his death in 1728, the largest chunk of 
this credit came from his son and son-in-law. What this does show, however, is that Cruijwagen possessed large amounts of 
cash which he could loan out. 
103  Joseph Schumpeter, the pioneering theoretician of entrepreneurship, identiﬁed three motivations for entrepreneurs: personal 
enrichment; a need to prove oneself and ʻthe joy of creating, of getting things doneʼ; J.A. Schumpeter, ʻEntrepreneurship 
as innovationʼ, in R. Swedburg, ed., Entrepreneurship: The Social Science View (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000): 
70-71. 
104  W.J. Baumol, ʻEntrepreneurship: Productive, unproductive, and destructiveʼ, Journal of Political Economy 98 (1990): 
897.
105  Lesger, ʻOver het nutʼ: 58.
106  It seems plausible, though, from a psychological point of view that his poor background and presumably difﬁcult years as 
a teenager when his parents and other family members died in quick succession, in addition to the terrible years of war he 
experienced, may have made him more determined to succeed and build up wealth as a form of protection. 
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 The first indication of Eksteenʼs standing in the community comes from 
1716 when he and eleven other free burghers submitted a request to the VOC for 
some reduction in taxes. Among the names are prominent and well-off farmers 
of the Cape district such as the Van der Westhuijzens, Nicolaas Loubser and the 
wealthy Verweij sisters, Aletta and Beatrix.107 It is a sign of Eksteenʼs success that 
within six years of his entering agriculture he could – at least in symbolic terms 
– act as a spokesperson for the farming community.108 Another indication of 
Eksteenʼs growing standing in the free burgher community was his elevation to 
ensign in the burgher militia in June 1718, a rank he held for the following seven 
years. Clearly, by the late 1710s – after ten years as an alcohol pachter, and mak-
ing a success of agriculture and fishing – Eksteen was a leading free burgher, and 
this the VOC authorities at the Cape had to notice. So, we find him nominated for 
his first public office – that of Commissioner of Marriage and Civil Affairs – in 
1718, although he was not chosen that year. He wa,s however, elected in 1719 
and re-elected in 1720. Clearly Eksteen must have made a good impression, for 
he was chosen very soon after this, in 1722, as both an Orphan Master and as one 
of the Burgher Councillors – the highest public office a free burgher could hold 
at the Cape. He served several more terms as an Orphan Master in the 1720s and 
was continuously re-elected as Burgher Councillor until the end of 1738 when he 
retired from public office.109 
 In just over twenty years Eksteen managed to reach the highest political 
office a free burgher could attain at the Cape while his social prestige was such 
that already in 1723, when he and Johannes Blankenberg were involved in a fra-
cas with the Governor, they were referred to ʻals van de considerabelste deeser 
ingesetenen sijnde  ʼ (as being [part] of the most considerable of these inhabit-
ants).110 His standing amongst his fellow burghers is reflected in his election to 
the rank of lieutenant and, shortly thereafter, to captain of the burgher militia in 
1725 – once again the highest post available in this public body. During the 1720s 
Eksteen also acted as a fire warden, which made him one of very few free bur-
ghers in the history of Dutch Cape Town to have held every public office open to 
him. There can be no doubt that Eksteenʼs entrepreneurial activities enabled him 
not only to prove himself but to increase his wealth, power and prestige greatly.
 This social prestige and increasing respect that Eksteen commanded in the 
1720s did not weaken his entrepreneurial skills or desire to expand his business 
enterprises. During the 1720s Eksteen continued to invest in property and land, 
buying at least three more freehold farms and two town properties over and above 
those he owned in 1718. By this stage his capital base was so large that he could, 
with the exception of his fishing activities, concentrate on agricultural ventures. 
He continued to buy livestock at auctions throughout this period and by 1731 he 
107  All three these families had farms in the Tijgerberg, although some also owned others. On Aletta and Beatrix Verweij, see 
Schoeman, ʼn Duitser aan die Kaap: 231-35.
108  De Wet, ed., Resolusies, vol. 5: 32-33.
109  This is based on the relevant entries in A.J. Böeseken and G.C. de Wet, eds., Resolusies, vols. 5-9.
110  Böeseken, ed., Resolusies, vol. 6: 244-45.
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had doubled his number of oxen. Presumably he must have regularly sold off his 
sheep to the meat pachters since the number of his sheep did not increase much 
during this period.111 During the 1730s he also concentrated on horse breeding 
since the number of his horses doubled during that decade. In addition, the ever- 
alert Eksteen also exploited the Companyʼs attempts to introduce wool farming 
to South Africa, though this time with less success: in 1725 the VOC imported 
Kirman goats from Persia which, the Company hoped, could be interbred at the 
Cape with other goats or sheep to produce wool sheep. The procedure was com-
plicated and Eksteen, given his background in Germany and his entrepreneurial 
skill, was asked to take on the project. By 1735, however, he had to report that 
his attempts were not successful.112 All of these activities required a large labour 
force and thus Eksteenʼs slave holding increasing from 46 in 1718 to 100 by 1731 
and 125 ten years later, in addition to some Khoi workers.113 The large increase 
in the 1720s was most likely the result of his growing agricultural concerns. 
Between 1731 and 1741 the median number of slaves which arable farmers had 
in the Cape district fluctuated between 15 and 22; while in 1731 only 19 per 
cent of farmers in the Cape district had slave holdings of more than 20 slaves.114 
Eksteenʼs large number of slaves (no doubt spread out over a number of farms) 
must have made him one of the biggest slave owners, if not the biggest, outside 
the VOC itself at the Cape of Good Hope.115 These slaves serve both as an indica-
tion of Eksteenʼs wealth and as a reminder of what made his economic expansion 
possible in Cape society. 
Eksteen the Entrepreneur: Meat and Soap
In 1719 Eksteen married his third wife, Alida van der Heijden, who was to bear 
him twelve children and outlive him by more than 40 years. Eksteenʼs relations 
with the Cruijwagen family did not suffer from this at all – in fact, it seems that 
he tended to keep the contacts he built up through his marriages and various un-
dertakings throughout his life. Both the Cruijwagens and the Van der Heijdens 
played a major role in the success of Eksteen during the 1720s–30s. Thus their 
own networks brought in a larger circle of potential creditors and helpers, e.g. his 
sister-in-law Catharina Cruijwagen married Cornelis Heufke, the son of one of 
the major pachters of the 1720s–30s, Johannes Heufke; while in 1730 his brother- 
in-law Willem van der Heijden married Helena Josina Esser, the daughter of the 
alcohol pachter Isaac Esser.116 Most importantly, however, Johannes Cruijwagen, 
Eksteenʼs former brother-in-law, entered the meat pacht in 1728 with Eksteen as 
111  CA, A 2250, box 1, opgaaf for 1731 (transcribed by Hans Heese). 
112  For a variety of climatic and other reasons; cf. De Wet, ed., Resolusies, vol. 9: 10-11 and Thom, Geskiedenis van die 
Skaapboerdery: 264-65.
113  N. Penn, The Forgotten Frontier: Colonist and Khoisan on the Cape sʼ Northern Frontier in the 18th Century (Athens: Ohio 
University Press and Cape Town: Double Storey, 2005): 298 n. 124.
114  Worden, Slavery in Dutch South Africa: 29 and 32. 
115  We unfortunately do not know much about his slaves, but it seems likely that there must have been specialisation in such a 
large labour force, as was the case with Martin Melkʼs similarly large slave holding in the second half of the century. 
116  Heese and Lombard, Genealogies, vol. 2: 233 and vol. 3: 355.
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one of his sureties.117 The timing of this is not coincidental. Jan Mijndertsz Cruijwa-
gen had died shortly before this, leaving his large estate to his two children and his 
surviving Eksteen grandchild.118 It may well have been this injection of cash which 
convinced Eksteen to join Cruijwagen and his new father-in-law, Pieter Jurgen van 
der Heijden, in the meat pacht. The ﬁnancial security, large land and stock hold-
ings, and the large circle of contacts and connections that these families had built 
up over the years, made it possible for them to control the most lucrative trade at 
the Cape for almost two decades. 
 By the late 1720s, with the combined resources of all these family connec-
tions, Eksteen felt financially secure enough to embark on his biggest venture 
yet, viz. the meat pacht. The meat pacht differed substantially from the alcohol 
pacht. The fact that there were no pachtpenningen to be paid made it seem easier 
to enter, but the sheer size of the operation, and the investments and contacts that 
it required, made it something that only financially very stable people with good 
contacts among the cattle farmers could take on. The risks were phenomenal: the 
successful bidders secured the contract by offering to provide the Company with 
meat for an extended period at a rate offered by them at the start of that period, 
i.e. without knowing exactly what either the demand (dependent on the number 
of ships) or the supply (dependent on the state of the stock holdings in the Colony 
and farmers  ʼwillingness to sell at a certain price) would be.119 To minimise this 
risk, which was compounded by the fact that the Company was most unlikely to 
change the terms of the contract once it had been accepted, a meat pachter need-
ed good stock holdings of his own, in addition to sizeable amounts of land and 
labour. 
 Eksteen entered the meat pacht because of the involvement of his former 
brother-in-law Johannes Cruijwagen, who took on one-quarter of the pacht in 
1728.120 In the following year, the pacht was awarded to Cruijwagen, Eksteen 
and Eksteenʼs father-in-law, Pieter Jurgen van der Heijden, along with Jacob 
van Bochem, a former alcohol pachter. As an experiment, the VOC authorities 
awarded them the contract for a three-year period, a sure indication that the quar-
tet was deemed capable of providing the goods.121 This they did to the satisfaction 
of all parties concerned, for in 1732 all four successfully secured the meat pacht 
for the following five years. Van Bochem died but was replaced as meat pachter 
by Aletta van Es, who was related to the other three by marriage, in 1737 when 
they received a contract for another five years.122 Although Eksteen died in 1741 
his obligations continued until the expiry of the contract. His estate was clearly 
117  On Johannes Cruijwagen as meat pachter, see Cruywagen, Die Cruywagens: 202-10; and on his activities as commando 
leader (ʻprotecting  ʼhis herds of livestock and interests on the pastoral frontier), see Penn, Forgotten Frontier: 66-70.
118  Eksteen had three children with Everdina Cruijwagen, but only the eldest, Catharina Rosina, survived infancy. 
119  The pachters had to provide a very good rate (cost price or even less) to the VOC in exchange for the monopoly right to 
provide meat to foreign ships. As the number of the latter ﬂuctuated wildly during this period, the business of providing 
meat to the port could be very risky. 
120  CA, C 2703: 40.
121  CA, C 2703: 74-86 and De Wet, ed., Resolusies, vol. 8: 11.
122  CA, C 2704: 62-73 and 2706: 18-29.
28
well geared towards this business, for in 1742 his widow was part of the quartet 
awarded the meat pacht for a further five years.123 
 Even during the 1730s, when Eksteen was immensely busy running the 
major undertaking of providing the VOC with meat, along with his official 
duties which would keep him in meetings several days a week, this entrepreneur 
still kept his eyes open to exploit lucrative possibilities. In describing the iso-
lated retail market that operated in the Cape during this period – a market which 
depended on the irregular supply of retail goods from visiting ships – Mentzel 
gives the following example of Eksteenʼs economic activities: 
Another article of common use [in addition to tobacco] that is liable 
to equally rapid fluctuation in price is soap. I can instance the case 
of a burgher called Eckstein who laid in a stock of 20,000 lbs. at  
6 stuivers124 per lb. at a time when the market was glutted, owing to an 
unusually large number of shipments that came in within a short space 
of time. Some six weeks later it became known that no fresh soap was 
likely to arrive within the next three months, and then this astute specu-
lator sold out at 20 stuivers per lb., netting within a short while a profit 
of f 14,000.125
 This seemingly straightforward account of the economic reality at the Cape 
contains within it almost all the elements which account for Eksteenʼs success as 
an entrepreneur. 
 As mentioned above, all economic activity is subject to uncertainty.126 
Consumers of soap at the Cape could not foretell how long the good sup-
ply would last. It is this uncertainty that Eksteen exploited for his own profit. 
According to Mises it is precisely this exploitation of uncertainty which results 
in profit or loss, not capital investment. What Eksteen had done was to judge ʻthe 
future prices of products more correctly than other people do [and to buy] some 
or all of the factors of production at prices which, seen from the point of view 
of the future state of the market, [were] too lowʼ.127 This is what an entrepreneur 
does: to make decisions or, phrased differently, to exploit opportunities.128 Profit 
(or loss) arises from entrepreneurs who notice and exploit opportunities created 
by uncertainties inherent in the market.129 What distinguishes entrepreneurs from 
123  CA, C 2707: 71-81.
124  There were twenty stuivers to a guilder. 
125  Mentzel, Geographical-Topographical Description, vol. 2: 76.
126  F.M. Scherer, Industrial market structure and economic performance (2nd ed., Boston: Houghton Mifﬂin, 1980), 29.
127  Mises, ʻEntrepreneur and proﬁtʼ, 89. The converse, however, also holds: if the entrepreneur misjudges the future prices, 
the result would be a loss. This means that ʻone entrepreneurʼs error basically creates another entrepreneurʼs opportunity  ʼ
and implies that entrepreneurs can learn from their own errors; R. Swedburg, ʻThe Social science view of entrepreneurship: 
Introduction and practical applicationsʼ, in R. Swedburg, ed., Entrepreneurship: The Social Science View (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), 23.
128  Cf. Mises, ʻEntrepreneur and proﬁtʼ, 97: ʻIt is the entrepreneurial decision that creates either proﬁt or loss. It is mental 
acts, the mind of the entrepreneur, from which proﬁts ultimately originate. Proﬁt is a product of the mind, of success in 
anticipating the future state of the market. It is a spiritual and intellectual phenomenon.ʼ
129  ʻOpportunity  ʼ is necessarily a relativistic concept since opportunities vary over time and from person to person. H.J. 
Stevenson and J.C. Jarillo, ʻA paradigm of entrepreneurship: Entrepreneurial managementʼ, Strategic Management Journal 
11 (1990): 23 deﬁne ʻopportunity  ʼin this context as ʻa future situation which is deemed desirable and feasibleʼ.
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other people is not their possession of specific skills or forces of production, but 
their behaviour. What had set Eksteen apart from others was his ability to cor-
rectly anticipate ʻuncertain eventsʼ130 (his spotting of the opportunity), his will-
ingness to act on this131 (his grasping of the opportunity) and his decision to act 
on this knowledge (his exploitation of the opportunity). 
 Eksteen was an entrepreneur because he grasped and exploited opportuni-
ties like that described by Mentzel. How did he manage to do that? Through his 
access to different types of information and knowledge:132 Eksteenʼs long experi-
ence of Cape circumstances had taught him that fresh soap was a commodity in 
constant but erratic supply. So when there was a glut (instead of assuming, like 
others, that it would last), he used his knowledge of the opportunity as well as the 
suspicion (based on previous experience) that the supply would drop, to buy up 
the existing stock. He needed, of course, a capital outlay of f 6 000 but the pos-
session of that money is not the central issue in this entrepreneurial activity: a 
person with a confident expectation of success could have loaned the money.133 
It was Eksteenʼs possession of local knowledge about the circumstances at the 
Cape, the characteristics of its market and, possibly, ʻinsider  ʼ knowledge about 
current sources of soap supply134 that enabled him to exploit the opportunity. In 
addition to this, Eksteen possessed ʻalertness  ʼ– the ability to spot relevant new 
information or resources – which enabled him to make decisions about new 
profit opportunities.135 Crucial for the success of this venture, and all the others 
in which Eksteen had engaged during his long career, was the possession of alert-
ness and local knowledge, and the will and desire to grasp it.
Conclusion: A Cape Entrepreneur
Thus ended the entrepreneurial activities of Eksteen after almost 40 years at the 
Cape. His career illustrates clearly how it was possible for someone without capi-
tal to increase wealth by exploiting opportunities, even in a place like the VOC 
130  R. Swedburg, ʻSocial science viewʼ: 20 summarises Mises  ʼdeﬁnition of entrepreneurship as ʻanticipations of uncertain 
events.  ʼFor a discussion of Mises  ʼwork on entrepreneurship, see Hébert and Link, The Entrepreneur: 127-30.
131  Mises did not dwell on the importance of the willingness of the entrepreneur to grasp an opportunity. Several people can 
notice an opportunity, but it is only the entrepreneur who is willing to take on the risk and goes one step further, viz. to act 
on the opportunity arising. Thus Stevenson and Jarillo, ʻParadigm of entrepreneurshipʼ: 17-27, consider the willingness to 
pursue opportunities as the deﬁning characteristic of entrepreneurs. 
132  Knowledge is crucial to economic activities. Since in any given situation a personʼs knowledge of that situation does not 
correspond with the facts, it means that there is a need ʻfor a process by which knowledge is constantly communicated and 
acquired.  ʼMoreover, knowledge is dispersed and nobody has it in its totality. The consequence of these differential states of 
knowledge is that a personʼs possession of (or control over) knowledge can be used to his or her advantage. Cf. F.A. Hayek, 
ʻThe use of knowledge in societyʼ, in idem, Individualism and Economic Order (London and Henley: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1976 [1949]): 77-91. 
133  Cf. Mises, ʻEntrepreneur and proﬁtʼ: 95: ʻThose who know how to take advantage of any business opportunity cropping 
up will always ﬁnd the capital required  ʼ and Stevenson and Jarillo, ʻParadigm of entrepreneurshipʼ: 23: Entrepreneurs 
ʻpursue opportunities without regard to the resources they currently control.  ʼ Likewise, I.M. Kirzner, Competition and 
Entrepreneurship (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1973): 38-39 argues that entrepreneurs do not require 
ʻmeans  ʼin order to make decisions, i.e. to grasp opportunities.
134  Since by this stage Eksteen was a meat pachter who routinely had to supply meat to visiting ships, he could have learned of 
the opportunity via that; or, alternatively, in the course of his duties as burgher councillor who sat in on the meeting of the 
Council of Policy. 
135  Hence Kirznerʼs deﬁnition of an entrepreneur as ʻa decision-maker whose entire role arises out of his alertness to hitherto 
unnoticed opportunitiesʼ; Competition and Entrepreneurship: 41.
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Cape with its highly limited opportunities for free trade. Entrepreneurship can 
flourish under the most adverse of conditions, and Eksteen clearly made use of 
almost every opportunity that the Cape did offer: starting with the alcohol retail 
trade – which is the easiest to enter and which offered continuity and the possi-
bility of expansion. This he successfully exploited for 15 years during which he 
used his profits to diversify his assets and to invest in agriculture. By the 1720s 
he could concentrate on his wide-ranging agricultural concerns, while also hav-
ing a profitable sideline providing fish to a stable market. In the last decade of his 
life, his expertise and experience of life at the Cape helped him to make a success 
of the most profitable, and also the greatest risk-bearing, enterprise at the Cape 
– providing the VOC with a regular supply of meat. However, even though this 
would have ensured a very sizeable profit, Eksteen could not resist opportunities 
to speculate, even in the 1730s when he was very wealthy – some of this paid off 
handsomely, such as his soap hoarding, while others, like his experiment with 
wool farming, were doomed to failure. It was Eksteenʼs ability to grasp opportu-
nities and his willingness to take on risks which made him the wealthiest man at 
the Cape in the 1730s, not the capital which he did not possess when he started 
off in 1705.136 
 Not only did Eksteenʼs entrepreneurial activities enable him to be successful 
during his own lifetime, but it also laid the foundation for an influential eigh-
teenth-century Cape dynasty.137 As already mentioned, his wife was able to live 
wealthily and expand her business interests for another four decades, while most 
of his (legitimate) children entered advantageous alliances with other families. 
Only two of Eksteenʼs children were married by the time he died in 1741, but the 
marriage pattern of his children, most of whom wed during the 1740s, reveals 
the extent of the large social network Eksteen had built up. Most of his daughters 
married medium-ranking VOC officials: the minister Henricus Cock (in the mid-
1730s), the administrators Joachim Prehn (1739) and Jan Raeck (1746), and the 
surgeon Rijno Berthault de St. Jean. The last was the son of the chief surgeon, 
and his sister shortly thereafter married Eksteenʼs namesake and oldest surviving 
son in 1744. The other son, Petrus Michiel, married Sophia Cloete, from a fore-
most burgher family, who was also related to the wealthy Loubser farming fam-
ily, one of whose sons also married an Eksteen daughter.138 These sons and their 
descendants were destined to play influential roles in colonial Cape society. 
 The outcome of Eksteenʼs life, from poor beginnings in Lobenstein to leav-
ing a dynasty of wealthy children marrying into successful families at the Cape 
of Good Hope, is a felicitous example of the principle underlying social capital 
136  In 1705 the Eksteen household was listed as consisting of one adult male, one adult female and one boy who together owned 
no possessions worth listing in the opgaaf whatsoever. My thanks to Hans Heese who shared with me his transcription of 
the 1705 opgaaf in the Nationaal Archief in The Hague. 
137  In psychological terms, one could note that it may have been pride in this achievement which made him request in his will of 
1739 that his estate not be broken up after his death: ʻen dewijl ik niet en begeer dat den boedel daarom sal moeten vercogt 
werden, maar integendeel dat mijn gemelte huijsvrouw … in het volle bezit gelaten werden…  ʼand ʻzoo wil en begeer ik 
niet dat zig ijmand anders met mijne kinderen of goederen bemoeijen sal, ten dien eijnde uijtsluijtende alle magistraaten, 
de weescamer, soo hier als elders, of wie ook eenig gezag of bewind daar over zouden kunnen of vermeijnen te hebben…ʼ, 
CA, CJ 2650: 255-57.
138  Heese and Lombard, Genealogies, vol. 2: 174-77.
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– one which is so crucial to all entrepreneurial success: connections count. This 
article, however, is about more than the specifics of Eksteenʼs success. Although 
his was an exceptional life in terms of his many successes, the mechanisms he 
used in his upward mobility are not. Much has been written about the growth of 
the Cape gentry, but little work has been done on how this came about, what were 
the actual mechanisms which made it possible for a fairly homogeneous group of 
free burghers (in terms of cultural background and economic possibilities) in the 
mid-seventeenth century to develop into a stratified society with a clearly identi-
fiable elite within less than century. Hopefully this article has illustrated the use-
fulness of applying the concept of entrepreneurialism to understanding the rise of 
the Cape gentry, while also showing that some aspects of it (such as its supposed 
rural roots and the role of endogamy) need to be revisited. Eksteenʼs remarkable 
career is exemplary of how the Cape, despite the constraints of the VOC monop-
oly, did offer sufficient opportunities for an entrepreneurial individual to create 
wealth. The challenge now remains to establish why some and not others could 
use these mechanisms to become economically and socially ascendant. 
